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Abstract
This paper is about quality decisions in a vertical structure where competi-
tive producers sell to ’powerful retailers’. Speciﬁcally, we focus the analysis on
the role played by a tour operator (TO) on quality investments when distribut-
ing the capacity of a given tourist destination. We emphasize the presence of
quality externalities among hotel establishments, and see that sometimes a TO
distribution can provide a solution to the ’tragedy of the commons’ in quality
provision. Thus, we analyze what implications do vertical relations have for
quality in this industry, and then derive some policy recommendations.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Tourism is clearly an important economic sector from an international perspective.
The number of international tourists travelling in the world reached 664 million in
1999. France, Spain and United States were the world’s top three destinations. United
States, Germany and Japan spent US$ 141 billion on international tourism in 1999.1
Features such as market power, vertical relations and externalities make the tourism
sector interesting from an economic perspective. However, there is not, to our knowl-
edge, sound theoretical analysis that closely looks at the sector.
Our aim is precisely to contribute to ﬁll this gap. Speciﬁcally, this paper is about
quality choices in a vertical structure where competitive producers sell to ’powerful
retailers’. Our framework emphasizes the presence of quality externalities among
producers. It is thus particularly suited to study the ingredients that determine
quality in the tourist resort industry and about the role played by tour operators.
Environmental issues are increasingly being perceived as important in the tourism
sector. According to Bywater(1992) ”The demand for a higher quality product is uni-
versal across Europe. (It) is expressed not just in expectations of the standard of the
accommodation and service at the destination, but also in demand for a better envi-
ronment”. In the same line, Huybers and Bennet (2000) study the relative importance
of the natural environment on the choices made by UK prospective tourists regarding
the overseas holiday destinations. They highlight the importance of the environment
among the attributes of holiday destinations. In fact they found that potential over-
seas tourists were willing to pay a substantial premium to visit a destination with a
high level of environmental quality.
Indeed, a distinguishing feature of this sector of the economy is that the quality
of a speciﬁcr e s o r ta ﬀects the environment and thus the quality of the region where it
is located so that there exist externalities across hotel owners in a speciﬁcz o n e .T h e
question arises as to what implications do vertical relations have for quality in this
industry and whether there is a role for public policy.
To the extent that a tour operator acts as a distributor of a large share of the
supply in a region, it provides a solution to the commons’ tragedy that aﬀects hotel
owners since it can negotiate price schedules conditional on quality upgrades. How-
ever, tour operators exhibit market power (e.g. Baum and Mudabi, 1994), and as
a consequence, they have an incentive to restrict the capacity they distribute to the
market segment that it is under their control. This goes against the TO’s ability to
increase the quality of the region by contracting with many hotels, requesting quality
upgrades and internalizing the quality externalities.
1World Tourism Organization (2000).
2Thus, our ﬁrst result is to show that the TO faces a basic trade-oﬀ:i n o r d e r
to have incentives to request quality upgrades from the HOWs it contracts with,
it should distribute a large enough capacity; however, market power leads him to
restrict the capacity it distributes. In the resolution of this trade-oﬀ, the capacity of
the region plays an important role. If there is a large accomodation capacity in the
region, the tour operator would have to contract with too many hotels if he wanted to
substantially increase the quality of the region. This could imply a too large reduction
in the price charged to tourists.
The presence of this trade-oﬀ drives the second result of the paper. We show
that the impact of the monopolistic tour operator on quality depends on the existing
capacity, and hence there can be an important role of public policy. More speciﬁ-
cally, we identify conditions under which in equilibrium the TO will request quality
upgrades. While a minimum accommodation capacity is required to insure that the
TO has incentives to request quality upgrades, if there are too many hotels the tour
operator will ﬁnd more proﬁtable not to increase the quality of the region. Next, we
study how alternative vertical structures inﬂuence quality choices by the establish-
ments of the region. We ﬁnd that reducing the monopoly power of the tour operator
m a yh a v ev e r yd i ﬀerent consequences on quality depending on whether market power
is eroded through cooperation of hotel owners or through internet direct distribution
to tourists. Indeed, while eroding monopoly power via the joint venture will result in
overall higher quality levels, internet direct distribution will decrease overall quality,
since then no internalization of the quality externalities will take place.
Our focus is on the role of an intermediary in the provision of quality in a frame-
work with perfect information. Therefore, bya s s u m p t i o n ,w ee x c l u d et h er o l eo fi n t e r -
mediaries as agents who can become ’experts’ as in Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and
Friedman (1994). Likewise, we rule out investigating the intermediaries’ incentives to
reveal and certify quality as in Lizzieri (1999) or Admati and Pﬂeider (1986, 1990).
We also depart from the strand of the literature dealing with the intermediaries’
quality as, for instance Matutes and Vives (1996).
In our setting access to customers is an ’essential facility’. Unlike the theory
of ’essential facilities’, (see Rey and Tirole (1997) for a survey) we do not address
the possibility of foreclosure through contractual restraints or vertical integration.
Yet, some of the ingredients present in our model appear in the literature exploring
vertical restraints (e.g. Mathewson and Winter (1984) and Rey and Tirole (1986)).
Mathewson and Winter (1984), for instance, assume that there are informational ex-
ternalities across diﬀerentiated retailers, which as a result advertise less than optimal
whenever the marginal price they pay equals or exceeds the cost of production. A
manufacturer will give incentives to retailers to optimally advertise by oﬀe r i n gac o n -
tract with a two part tariﬀ and will set the marginal price below cost. Rey and Tirole
(1986) study retail price maintenance and exclusive territories as ways to mitigate
3the problem of externalities among retailers. In contrast to previous literature, in our
framework externalities arise among producers (rather than among retailers). To our
knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper to emphasize the presence of externalities among
producers, and explore in which way do vertical relations aﬀect quality choices in
such a framework.2
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes alternative vertical structures, and section
5 concludes with some discussion of the empirical evidence and of the policy impli-
cations of the paper. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
2 The model
We envision the tourist sector as one where relatively small but not powerless hotel
owners (HOWs) negotiate with a rather powerful tour operator (TO). We also take
the view that quality is an important element in these negotiations. As an example,
TUI, the largest European TO, surveys hotels they contract with using a environ-
ment checklist that includes information on hotel’s steps and activities to protect the
environment.3
More speciﬁcally, we focus on the negotiation between a TO who ’controls’ the
distribution for tourist services in one demand segment, which, for instance, corre-
sponds with a given country, and a series of hotel owners (HOWs). On one hand, we
model TOs that exhibit substantial market power. Fitch (1987), Baum and Mudabi
(1994) and Evans and Stabler (1995) conﬁrm this hypothesis.4 Morover, the industry
trend is nowadays clearly towards concentration as Thomson, the ﬁrst player in the
UK market also controlling 40% of the Scandinavian market accepted the take over
oﬀer of Preussag, the biggest German counterpart.56 On the other hand, we model
HOWs that are small, yet not powerless, since they have the option to trigger to a
diﬀerent demand segment, i.e., to sell their product in the international market (i.e.
ad i ﬀerent country), and obtain the proﬁt of this outside option.
2Cabral (2000, chapter 11) presents a short and descriptive example of training externalities
between car producers, which, in contrast to our externalities, can be solved by means of exclusive
dealing.
3The checklist includes information as water waste treatment and energy savings. This informa-
tion was obtainned from TUI website visited on April 25, 2002. http://www.tui-umwelt.com/cms-
site/index.php3?lg=3&t1=2&t2=1&t3=0&t4=0
4Gratton and Richards (1997) ﬁnd mixed evidence: whereas the UK TO market seems to be
constestable, the German one is a stable oligopoly.
5See The Economist, May 20, 2000
6Tour Operators had traditionally kept their markets rather segmented, with the British TOs
controlling UK and the Scandinavian countries, while German tour TOs expanded around Belgium
and Holland, see Bywater(1992).
4We consider ﬁxed hotel capacity. When negotiation with the TO takes place,
the HOWs have already chosen some certain ex-ante quality level, for instance they
have built in a speciﬁc location, and thus the quality of the construction is already in
place, just as the swimming pool, or other recreational facilities. The TO, however,
can negotiate some quality upgrading. For instance, it can request the building to be
painted, the gardening improved, or the furniture replaced. Indeed, quality upgrades
are an essential component of negotiations between HOWs and TOs, who may accept
to pay higher prices, provided some investments to improve the hotel are made.
Next, quality externalities are an essential building block of our framework. In
practice, both the ex-ante quality choice and the quality upgrades have an impact on
the intrinsic quality of the hotel and also aﬀect the environment, hence the average
quality of the region. Thus, we think of the quality of the region as a function of
the intrinsic quality of all the hotels in the region. For instance, the design of the
surrounding buildings can be as important as the design of the own hotel; or one is
likely to meet customers of nearby hotel in restaurants, beach etc., so if one customer
dislikes night life, may be he should not choose some areas, regardless of what the
intrinsic characteristics of a hotel are. Most importantly, hotels can be more or less
environment friendly depending on how they dispose of garbage, residual waters etc.
Clearly, the impact of one hotel in the environment has consequences on the perceived
quality of all the hotels in the area. Hence, externalities across hotels are a key factor
to understand the industry.
The presence of these externalities creates a common’s problem: quality is jointly
produced by all HOWs in the region. In consequence, quality will tend to be un-
derprovided in our setting. However, the TO internalizes the beneﬁt generated by
quality upgrades, and can provide incentives to do them by setting the appropriate
prices.
In the following we present the timing and the details of the model. The timing
is as follows:
S t a g e1 :N e g o t i a t i o nb e t w e e nt h eT Oa n dt h eH O W s
The tour operator (TO) chooses with which HOWs to negotiate, and oﬀers them a
price. The price can be conditional upon a quality upgrade (and upon initial quality).
That is, the TO can oﬀer prices y
j
0 to n0 HOWs of quality j for their capacity; in
addition, it may choose to oﬀer a price y
j
1 to n1 HOWs in case they invest in upgrading
their quality. HOWs accept or reject the oﬀer.
Stage 2: Quality upgrades
HOWs who have signed contracts to upgrade the quality do their investment. The
rest of HOWs might also upgrade their quality.
Stage 3: Production and Payments
5The TO sells the capacity it has bought in his home market, and payments are
made. Those HOWs who rejected the oﬀer or were not proposed a deal by the TO
obtain their outside option.
Hotel establishments and the production of quality
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a scenario in which there is a mass n of
inﬁnitesimal hotels with unit capacity and zero operational costs. Each hotel belongs
to a diﬀerent HOW.7 Each inﬁnitesimal hotel has already chosen some certain ex-ante
quality level, for instance they have built a speciﬁc location, and thus the quality of
the construction is already in place. This ex-ante quality has been chosen prior to the
negotiations with the TO. For simplicity, we assume it does not exhibit externalities,
and that it is the same for each hotel establishment, that is b Q.
When negotiations with the TO take place, the TO can impose some quality
upgrading by a discrete amount of ∆. The cost of this quality upgrading is c>0.
Given the nature of the problem we analyze, we assume that quality upgrading has
full external eﬀects, hence quality upgrading determines the environmental quality of
the hotel. The overall quality of a hotel is then given by a weighted average of its
ex-ante quality and the average environmental quality of all hotels in the region. In
particular, if n1 HOWs have upgraded their quality, the overall quality of hotel i is:






Thus, unless upgrades are contracted upon with the TO, individual HOWs will never
have the incentive to invest in upgrading, since they are inﬁnitesimal and their quality
is not aﬀected.
Outside option of HOWs
The outside opportunity of a hotel of quality j is given by Ej = E (qj), where
Ej(qj)=µ + βqj,
with µ>0a n dβ > 0. Thus, if the TO negotiates with a hotel of quality qj it
must oﬀer a price y0 = Ej and, in case it requests a quality upgrade it must oﬀer
ap r i c ey1 = Ej + c.8 Otherwise the hotel owner would reject. We assume that the
TO is strategic in that it realizes that requesting upgrades enhances the quality of
the region and it thus increases the outside option. On the other hand, for the sake
of simplicity, the outside option does not depend on quantity which basically means
7Calveras (2002) analyze the interaction between expansion strategies by hotel chains and envi-
romental quality.
8Notice that because both the quality upgrade is a public good and ﬁrms are inﬁnitesimal, the
outside opportunity of a ﬁrm is independent on whether or not it does the quality upgrade: hence
its costs must be fully covered.
6that the tourist region is small relative to the international market that does not
operate through the TO.
Thus, we model the outside option in a reduced form. Presumably, the outside
option when dealing with a powerful UK TO is to deal with another powerful, perhaps
a German TO, and thus TOs compete for capacity (more than for customers since
markets are quite segmented). We ignore these complex strategic interactions between
TOs while at the same time incorporating the fact that the TO, while powerful, cannot
completely expropriate the proﬁts of HOWs.
Demand for Tourist Services in the TO market segment
The market where the TO distributes the tourist services is as follows. As in
Shaked and Sutton (1982), consumers have unit demands and diﬀerent valuations for
quality, represented by the parameter θ. There is a mass 1 of consumers with their
valuation for quality uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. Thus, the utility
function of a tourist i with valuation for quality θi is given by
ui = θi · q − p,
where q is the quality of the tourist destination it visits, and p is the price paid. We
assume that consumers can choose to visit a destination with the services sold by
the TO at prices and qualities (p,q), or go to the rest of the world, of higher quality,
qR, and price pR (which makes sense since we are analyzing a problem of quality
underprovision). Thus, the indiﬀerent tourist is that with a valuation for quality θ
for which θ · q − p = θ · qR − pR, which implies θ =
pR − p
qR − q
. Therefore demand and








p = pR − (qR − q) · nTO,
where nTO is the quantity sold by the TO in its market segment.
3 Equilibrium
Given that there are n HOWs in the market, all with the same basic quality b Q,h o w
many HOWs will the TO contract with, and how many will be requested to upgrade
quality in stage 1? Notice that when requesting a HOW to upgrade its quality, the
TO must pay him its outside option plus the full cost of upgrading c. Otherwise, the












n0 + n1 ≤ n,
n1 > 0,n 0 > 0.
where n0 is the hotel capacity contracted by the TO that is not requested quality
upgrading and n1 is the hotel capacity that is requested quality upgrading; and y0, y1
is the price paid by the TO to the HOWs, depending on whether quality upgrading




(p − E(q)) ∗ (n0 + n1) − c ∗ n1
subject to
n0 + n1 ≤ n,
n1 > 0,n 0 > 0.
Recall that since upgrades are a pure public good only hotels who are requested
and given incentives by the TO will upgrade their quality. It follows that the qual-
ity marketed by the TO is b q = α · b Q +( 1− α)∆n1
n . The following lemma starts
characterizing the solution of the TO problem.
Lemma 1 The TO requests quality upgrades from all the hotels it contracts with or
from none.
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
The intuition is as follows. Since upgrades are a pure public good, the TO cannot
extract more from the hotels that are requested to upgrade than from the others. In
fact, since all HOWs have the same outside option, the TO must give incentives to
HOWs to invest in upgrading and cover the whole cost. There are two possibilities
then: either the higher revenue that the TO can set for the higher quality upgraded
product covers or does not cover the cost in upgrading the quality. The latter includes
not only the direct cost paid to the HOWs requested to upgrade, but also an indirect
cost given by the fact that the higher quality of the region results in higher outside
opportunity cost for all the HOWs.
Lemma 2 There might be two local optima, which are candidate to being the opti-
mal solution of the TO problem. In one, the TO contracts with nTO
0 hotels where
8nTO
0 =m i n
·
n,b n0 =
pr − µ − βH1
2(qr − H1)
¸
, and requests no quality upgrades. nTO











. In the other one, the TO contracts with
nTO
1 hotels and requests them to upgrade their quality, with nTO
1 =m i n( n,b n1), where
b n1 is the negative root of the following equation:
3H2( b n1)
2 +2 ( H1 − q
r − βH2) b n1 + p
r − µ − βH1 − c =0 .
nTO











These lemmas lead us to the following propositions, where we ﬁrst examine quality
upgrading conditions in case the TO contracts with all HOW in the region. Notice
that this is a useful benchmark since in this case the TO fully internalizes all the
quality externalities. However, this does not mean that the TO will always upgrade
quality since it has to bear both the direct and indirect costs of doing so.
Proposition 1 When the TO contracts with all HOWs, it imposes quality upgrading
if and only if n> c
(1−α)∆ + β.
When the Tour Operator contracts with all HOWs it internalizes all externalities
from quality upgradings. In order to request upgrading to all HOWs, there needs to
be a minimum capacity (relative to both direct and indirect costs of upgrading) such
that the externalities that arise from quality upgrading are proﬁtable. Notice that
the ratio between c and (1 − α)∆ reﬂects that the cost must be small relative to the
increase in quality due to upgrading (1 − α)∆. As m a l lβ indicates that the outside
option will not increase much due to the upgrading.
In many cases however, the TO will not contract with all the HOWs of the region.
This erodes the incentives of the TO to request quality upgradings. On one hand,
the TO is the only one that pays both the direct and the indirect costs of upgrading;
on the other hand, it does not fully internalize the beneﬁts of upgrading, since some
HOWs do not contract with the TO but beneﬁt of a region where some hotels have
been upgraded. One possibility for the TO would be to contract with more HOWs
so as to be able to internalize to a greater extent the externalities that accrue from
quality upgrading. However, increasing the capacity it distributes to its own market
segment implies a reduction in the price tourists pay, a reduction which is non optimal
beyond a certain level.
Thus, we see there exists a trade-oﬀ in the strategy of the TO. Contracting with
more HOWs is good because of the larger internalization of the externalities that
accrue from quality upgrading. However, this also implies a reduction in the price it
can charge. And by limiting the distribution of capacity to its own market segment,
the TO dilutes its incentives to undertake quality upgrading.
9This trade-oﬀ explains why in many cases the TO will not contract with all HOWs,
in spite this means less quality upgrading, or no quality upgrading at all. Then,
upgrading will only take place when capacity is not too large, and we expect that there
still exists a minimum capacity of the region in order to require quality upgrading.
The following proposition formalizes these intuitions,
Proposition 2 When the TO does not contract with all the HOWs, then
1. for n ’neither too large nor too small’ the optimal strategy is to impose quality
upgrades provided that β and c are ’small enough’.
2. when n is very large, the TO does not require any quality upgrading to the HOWs
it contracts with.
The TO will request quality upgrading when capacity is not too large, even when it
does not completely internalize all quality externalities, for small upgrading costs and
small sensitivity of outside option to quality. However, when capacity is very large
the beneﬁts of upgrading dilute too much among HOWs that have not contracted
with the TO, hence the TO does not ﬁnd proﬁtable to request quality upgrading.
It is clear then the role of the intermediary (the TO) in solving the tragedy of
the commons in the provision of the public good. The TO faces a trade-oﬀ when
deciding with how many HOWs to contract with. On one hand, contracting with
more HOWs increases the internalization of the externalities of quality upgrading,
and thus increases the incentives to undertake such upgrading. On the other hand,
since the TO enjoys market power in its own market segment, a larger contracting and
distribution of hotel room capacity beyond a certain level will cause a non optimal
reduction in the price the TO can charge to tourists.
4 Alternative vertical structures
Now, we asses quality investments in our model relative to two other vertical struc-
tures. The ﬁrst one is a competitive industrial structure where HOWs directly dis-
tribute through internet to all tourists their hotel rooms. The second is one where
all HOWs in the region form a joint venture to jointly market their rooms.
4.1 Internet distribution without tour operators: competi-
tive outcome
Assume that consumers in the TO market gain access to internet and can thus buy
directly from the HOWs without any intermediation. Any HOW would supply its
capacity to this market if the price exceeded E, the outside opportunity. In other
words, direct distribution through internet would act as if the tour operator were
10replaced by an auctioneer that allocates hotels to the TO market and to the outside
option so that, given prices, revenue cannot be increased by reassigning hotels. Thus,
the auctioneer will assign capacity to the TO market and to the rest of the world






The following proposition analyzes the impact of eliminating monopoly power
through internet direct distribution.
Proposition 3 1. When distribution is done directly through internet, there is no
quality upgrading.
2. When HOWs distribute their rooms directly through internet, more capacity is
allocated to the TO market, and therefore less to the outside option market.
The ﬁrst result is immediate from the assumption that ﬁrms are inﬁnitesimal.
Since there is no TO that requires quality upgrading through a contract, it is never
in the interest of HOWs to upgrade the quality of their hotels. And the second result
is also clear: as long as p>Ethe auctioneer will allocate hotel rooms to the market
instead of to the rest of the world, that provides the outside option.
Thus we see that when distribution of capacity is done through internet, proﬁts
of HOWs are smaller than when the TO distributes and requests quality upgrading.
On one hand, with internet distribution there is no quality upgrading at all in hotel
rooms, which decreases the value of the outside option to HOWs that distribute to
the rest of the world. On the other hand, HOWs who distribute to the ’TO market’
also obtain this lower outside option (since p = E).9
4.2 A joint venture: a TO controlled by HOWs
We next consider the case where competitive HOWs in the industry associate and
form a TO which will control the distribution both to the TO market and to the rest
of the world. That is, we consider the case where the industry-controlled TO (ICTO)
maximizes joint proﬁts of all HOWs of the resort, and then its proﬁts are distributed
among all member of the industry. Thus the objective function of the ICTO is
π = p · nTO+( n − nTO) · E − c · nU,
where nTO is the capacity distributed to the former ’TO market’, and nU is the
capacity of the region to which the ICTO requests quality upgrading. Notice that
the ICTO, since it also distributes the region capacity to the rest of the world, can
also request quality upgrading (and pay c for it) to the HOWs who distribute their
9This is under the assumption that n is large enough so that in equilibrium is distributed to the
rest of the world.
11capacity to the outside option market (rest of the world), and not only to the ones
that distribute to the former ’TO market’.
The following proposition states that it is sometimes in the beneﬁt of the ICTO
to request quality upgrades to the hotels that distribute their capacity to the rest of
the world sometimes.
Proposition 4 1. The ICTO requests quality upgrades to all HOWs of the region
or to none.
2. For the same capacity distributed to the former TO market, the ICTO requests
quality upgrades to HOWs for a strictly larger parameter constellation than the
TO monopolist does.
3. When costs of quality upgrades are not so large, increases in capacity do not
reduce quality of the region.
When the ICTO decides to request quality upgrading, it does so to more HOWs
than the TO, speciﬁcally to all HOWs of the region. When deciding the contracts, an
ICTO internalizes all externalities of upgrading quality on all HOWs of the region,
not only the ones that it distributes to the former TO market. This of course in-
creases the incentives to request quality upgrading. Furthermore, the eﬀect of quality
upgrading in increasing the outside option is not a cost for the ICTO (as opposed to
the monopolist TO).
Furthermore, the ICTO does not face the trade-oﬀ that the TO monopolist faces.
As we explained above, the monopolist is able to internalize the externalities of the
q u a l i t yu p g r a d e st oal a r g e re x t e n ta sl o n ga si tc o n t r a c t sw i t hm o r eH O W sa n d
distributes them to the TO market. But this pushes down prices it can charge to the
tourists. Now, the ICTO captures all beneﬁts of quality upgrades without having to
increase the capacity that it distributes to the former TO market since it can request
quality upgrades to the HOWs that distribute to the rest of the world.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The aim of this paper has been to analyze the role played by tour operators in the
(environmental) quality investments of a given tourist destination. The presence of
quality externalities among hotel establishments makes that TOs can play a role in
the ’tragedy of the commons’ in the quality provision of the destination. We have
shown that the TO faces a fundamental trade-oﬀ. On one hand, increasing the
capacity it distributes implies higher incentives to require quality upgrading from the
hotels, since then the TO internalizes to a larger extent the externalities of quality
investments. On the other hand, since the TO enjoys market power in the demand
12segment it is serving, it has an incentive to restrict capacity to maintain higher prices.
This trade-oﬀ limits the ability of the TO to solve the ’tragedy of the commons’ in
the provision of quality.
We have also studied the eﬀect of alternative vertical structures on the quality
investments in a tourist destination. Inducing cooperation of the HOWs of a region
to form a joint venture to market its distribution through an industry controlled tour
operator (ICTO) is a better organizational alternative than promoting internet direct
distribution of hotel capacity. This is so because the former further enhances incen-
tives to undertake quality investments, whereas the latter eliminates these incentives.
Empirical evidence
There exists some evidence on the role played by TOs in the enhancement of
quality, including (but not only) environmental quality, both at an establishment
and at a regional level. Several papers show the role of TO distribution in the adop-
tion by hotel establishments of environmental management practices. Llull (2001)
ﬁnds that tour operators are the main agents (only after hotel shareholders and man-
agers) that inﬂuence environmental consciousness of hotel establishments, well before
suppliers, public administration, environmental regulation and competition. Crespi
and Orﬁla (2002) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between TO contract-
ing and the adoption of environmental innovations by Balearic hotel establishments.
Gonzalez and Leon (2001), in an analysis of environmental management of Spanish
hotels, obtain that stakeholder, including TOs, pressures help explain environmental
management development.
There is also ﬁrm speciﬁc evidence. According to its website, since 1992 the
leading European tour operator TUI surveys hotels they contract with using the TUI
environment checklist. One of the stipulations of TUI contracts is that this checklist
be ﬁlled out annually, with which the hotel management provides information on the
hotel’s steps and activities to protect the environment. The environment checklist
serves the Environment Division in assessing sustainable measures of individual hotels
or hotel chains as well as of the hotels in holiday regions or countries as a whole.
Policy implications
Quality is a permanent issue in the agenda of tourist regional governments and
tourism organizations, with a wide array of available policy instruments. We now
discuss some policy implications that are derived straight from our previous analysis,
focusing on capacity and entry regulation, and the organization of distribution.
First thing we have shown is that only when the TO contracts with all the HOWs
of the region, increasing capacity will never reduce quality. We have shown that
when the tour operator does not contract with all hotel establishments, an increase
in capacity may imply a reduction in the quality requirements of the tour operator. A
13higher capacity implies that the TO does not capture the eﬀects of quality upgrading,
and hence dilutes its incentives to request the hotels to upgrade their quality. Thus,
such an eﬀect provides a rationale for capacity and entry restrictions that are present
in many tourist destinations. Otherwise, increases in region capacity can imply a
reduction in the quality of the resort. An example of these capacity regulations can be
found in two important Spanish tourist regions. In both Balearic and Canary Islands,
the local governments have recently established capacity restrictions not allowing new
hotels to be built, unless old ones have been demolished.
Second, there are several examples of (successful or not) attempts made by HOWs
of a tourist destination to jointly market the overall capacity of the region (e.g.
Saturno ICTO in the Canary Islands). Our analysis supports governmental policies
that encourage such association, since a joint venture of HOWs will imply an increase
in the regional overall quality. On the other hand, the possible trend towards internet
direct distribution undertaken by hotel chains and establishments should be seen with
precaution by the authorities, for its implications concerning quality investments.
6 Appendix
Proof. of lemma 1.
For notational purposes let H1 ≡ α · b Q and H2 ≡
(1−α)∆
n .T h e nq = H1 + n1H2.




= p − E +( no + n1)(q − qR), substituting p,E
= pR − µ − βq +2 ( q − qR)(n0 + n1), substituting q,
=2 H2(n1)
2 + n1(−βH2 +2 H1 − 2qR)+ ( 1 )






+( no + n1)
2H2 − βH2(no + n1) − c (3)




=2 H2n1 +2 H1 − 2qR,
∂2π
∂no∂n1







+2 ( n0 + n1)H2 − βH2
=6 H2n1 +4 H2no − 2βH2 +2 ( H1 − qR).











− 2(q − qR),
∂2π
∂no∂n1
= −βH2 +2 H2(n0 + n1)+2 ( q − qR).













=2 ( q − qR) ∗ (2 ∗
∂2π
∂no∂n1





=4 ( q − qR)
∂2π
∂no∂n1













Since the determinant of the Hessian is smaller than zero, the interior solution can be
neither a maximum nor a minimum, since they both require the determinant to be
positive. Thus, when n0+n1 <ninterior solutions are neither a maximum nor a min-
imum. Therefore, the optimal solution to the TO problem is either {n0 > 0,n 1 =0 }
or {n0 =0 ,n 1 > 0}.
N o ww ee x a m i n et h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ec o n s t r a i n ti sb i n d i n g ,t h a ti s ,n0 +n1 = n.
To do so we solve the TO problem imposing that the constraint is binding, and by
substituting the constraint (n0 = n − n1) into the objective function of the TO, its
proﬁt function becomes:
πB =[ pR − (qR − H1 − n1H2) · n − µ + β (H1 + n1H2)] · n − c · n1.




2 · H2 − βH2 · n − c.
Doing some algebra we ﬁnd that this is positive for all n>β + c
(1−α)∆ and negative
for all n<β + c
(1−α)∆.
Hence, for any given n (except for the trivial case when n = β+ c
(1−α)∆), the deriva-
tive is either always positive or negative. Therefore, the solution to the problem is ei-
ther all upgrading or non upgrading; i.e. either {n0 = n,n1 =0 } or {n0 =0 ,n 1 = n}.
Proof. of lemma2.
Notice that from lemma 1, the TO requires upgrading from all the hotels he
contracts with (nTO
1 )o rf r o mn o n e( nTO
0 ). We have to consider several possibilities
depending on whether the constraint (n = n0 + n1) is binding or not.
First part, step 1. nTO




|(n1=0,b n0) =0 ; ii)
∂π
∂n1





|(n1=0,b n0) < 0; iv) b n0 <n .
15What is b n0 ? In order to verify the condition i), substitute n1 =0a n ds o l v ef o r
n0. This yields b no =
pR−µ−βH1
2(qR−H1) , which is well deﬁned since we assume that both the
numerator and the denominator are positive. (This means that the reservation price
of the market to which the monopolist sells is high enough, so that the monopolist
can extract a surplus by selling to the hotel at the outside option value; and the






=2 H1 − 2qR, condition iii)s a t i s ﬁes since (qR − H1) > 0h a s
been assumed above.






|(n1=0,b n0) + b n
2
0H2 − βH2b n0 − c
and ∂π
∂no|(n1=0,b n0) = 0 due to the calculus above, thus,
∂π
∂n1
|(n1=0,c n0) = b n
2
0H2 − βH2b n0 − c.
In order to guarantee condition (ii), we need that b n2
















Hence, for large enough n (since then conditions (ii)a n d( iv)h o l d ) ,b n0 is a local
optimum.
First part, step 2. nTO
0 = n is a local optimum when




2 · H2 − βH2 · n − c<0.




















Hence for small enough n, nTO
0 = n is a local optimum.
Therefore, from step 1 and step 2, nTO












Let’s now prove the second part of the lemma.
Second part, step 1. nTO












|(n0=0,b n1) < 0; iv) b n1 <n .
16Condition (i)i s :
∂π
∂n1
|(n0=0,b n1) =3 H2(b n1)
2 +2 ( H1 − qR − βH2)b n1 + pR − µ − βH1 − c =0
This equation has two solutions:





Assuming that pR−c−(µ + βH1) > 0 (the reservation price is big enough so that the
monopolist can have a surplus by paying to the hotel the outside option when n1 =0
and the cost of upgrading, i.e., pR− y1 > 0) both solutions are positive. However, we
will show that only b n1− condition (ii), while b n1+ does not. In order that a given b n1




It is immediate to see that
b n1− <
2(qR+βH2−H1)
6H2 < b n1+.
Therefore, we set b n1 = b n1−.






|(n0=0,b n1) − (H2b n
2
1 − βH2b n1 − c).
Due to condition (i), the ﬁrst part of the right hand side is zero, so we must guarantee
that the second part is negative, that is, the expression within brackets is positive.
This will be veriﬁed when












Second part, step 2. nTO
1 = n is a local optimum when n<b n1 and
∂πB
∂n1 > 0, that
is, when n>e n.
Then, from step 1 and 2, it is straightforward to see that the second part of the
lemma veriﬁes.
Proof. of proposition 1.














¿From lemma 2, if n>e n,t h a ti s ,n>β + c






cannot be an optimal solution, while
©
nTO
0 =0 ,n TO
1 = n
ª
satisﬁes the conditions for
a local optimum. Therefore, it is the optimal solution.
The proof goes analogous for the inverse.
17Proof. of proposition 2 (1).
In order to prove this proposition we need to prove that b n1 is a local optimum
(step 1) and that b n0 is not a local optimum (step 2), for n ’neither too large nor too
small’, and provided that β and c are not too large.
Step 1. A c c o r d i n gt ol e m m a2 ,f o rb n1 to be a local optimum it must be that









qR − H1 − 2 ∗ βH2 >
p
(qR − H1 + βH2)2 +3 H2(−pR + µ + βH1).
If (qR − H1 − 2 ∗ βH2) > 0, (it is clear that if it were negative the condition would
not be satisﬁe d )t h a ti sn>
2β(1−α)∆
qr−H1 , squaring the two terms we obtain
(qR − H1 − 2 ∗ βH2)
2 > (qR − H1 + βH2)
2 +3 H2(−pR + µ + βH1).
D o i n gs o m em o r ea l g e b r a ,w eo b t a i nt h a tt h i si ss a t i s ﬁed if and only if β
2H2 +
(pR − µ − β (2qr − H1)) > 0a n dn>
2β(1−α)∆





2β (1 − α)∆
qr − H1
.



















(2(qR − H1 + βH2))
2 +1 2 H2(−pR + µ + βH1 + c) < 0.
Therefore, there exists c∗ > 0 such that for 0 <c<c ∗ and above conditions, the
condition b n1 > e n is satisﬁed. Thus, b n1 is a local optimum.
Step 2. We want to show that, for some parameter constellations, b n0 is not










2 . For c =0 , this condition is true if and only if β <
pR−µ
(2qr−H1).
Hence, for c =0a n dβ <
pR−µ
(2qr−H1) this condition does hold and b n0 is not a local
optimum. Finally notice, that for given β and c , n cannot be too large, otherwise
above condition would not hold.
S i n c es t e p1a n ds t e p2h a v eb e e np r o v e n ,Q E D .
Proof. of proposition 2 (2)
18In order to have quality upgrading as a local optimum, we need: b n1 > e n,t h a ti s









2qR > βH2 +2
p




Take β =0a n dc>0. Then,
2qR > 2
p







(qR)2 +3 H2c +3 H2(−pR + µ).
Assuming that qR −
√








This holds for n small, since then H2 =
(1−α)∆
n is large. Thus, for β =0a n d



























9c ,t h a ti s , 4c
(2c+pR−µ)2 < 1
9c.]
So we have shown that for β =0 , and c>0 upgrading is not an optimum for n
large. Then for β > 0, if for a given n it was not an equilibrium, then it will neither be
an equilibrium, since it simply adds βH2 > 0 to the RHS of the equation/condition.
Proof. of Proposition 4.
The ICTO max
(nTO,nU)






(nTO− β)+β (1 − α)∆ − c,
∂π
∂nTO
= p − E − (qR − q) · nTO.
Notice that the ﬁrst derivative does not depend on nU,g i v e nav a l u eo fnTO.T h u s ,
∂π
∂nU is positive or negative depending on the value of nTO. Hence there are only two
possible solutions. For those nTO such that ∂π
∂nU > 0, nU = n; whereas for those nTO
such that ∂π
∂nU < 0, nU = 0. First point of the proposition has been shown.
For a given nTO, according to lemma 2, for the monopolist TO to request up-










. I nt h ec a s eo ft h eI C T O ,
19in order to have ∂π












Hence, the second point of the proposition has been shown.
In order to prove the third point of the proposition, assume that c<β (1 − α)∆.
Furthermore, notice that as long as there is upgrading (nU = n), nTO =
pR−µ−βq
2(qr−q) does
not vary with n. Hence if for a given n we have upgrading, that is, ∂π
∂nU > 0, increases
in n do not change the sign of the derivative; and therefore quality upgrading will
still take place.
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